In 1990s (in a pair of lawsuit/writs) the U.S. Supreme Court held that an employer is automatically liable under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act for discrimination by an employer who is a “supervisor.” On the other hand, if a co-worker discriminates, the company is liable only if the victim complains to her employer and the employer is negligent in responding to the complaint.
In the lawsuits based on Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the question is: who is the supervisor? Gurumurthy Kalyanaram analyzes this important question.
In 1990s (in a pair of lawsuit/writs) the U.S. Supreme Court held that an employer is automatically liable under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act for discrimination by an employer who is a “supervisor.” On the other hand, if a co-worker discriminates, the company is liable only if the victim complains to her employer and the employer is negligent in responding to the complaint.
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Relators in False Claim lawsuits quite often also incorporate the retaliation complaint. Gurumruthy Kalyanaram presents the decisions by various Courts on many FCA anti-retaliation lawsuit.
Employee reports of government fraud being committed by employers are a critical source of information. For this reason, the False Claims Act provides broad protection for employees from retaliation for any activities “in furtherance of” a possible FCA claim. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). Gurumurthy Kalyanaram Reports on U.S. Government’s Compelling Interest in a False Claims Act2/25/2014 One of the serious debates in FCA lawsuits is the purpose of the sealing provision. ACLU filed a lawsuit on this matter in the Fourth Circuit. This essay by Gurumurthy Kalyanaram reflects on this important public issue, which is anchored on competing public v. private interests.
It is now well established that the United States has a compelling government interest in protecting the confidentiality and integrity of ongoing fraud investigations. For that reason, Congress included the seal provision in the FCA. Here is a report on Collateral Estoppel and Materiality of an earlier finding by Professor Gurumurthy Kalyanaram, formerly of NYIT and UT Dallas.
A long line of decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court, U.S. Court of Appeals (Second Circuit), and New York Court of Appeals, have held that, where a decision-maker makes a finding, the finding is not collateral estoppel in a subsequent proceeding unless the finding was material and decisive to the decision, even if it was raised and litigated, particularly where the decision-maker himself explicitly states that the issue was “immaterial” to his decision, and that if there is any uncertainty at all, collateral estoppel shall not apply. This began with a lawsuit by Abigail Noel Fisher and Rachel Multer Michalewicz who applied to the University of Texas at Austin in 2008 and were denied admission. The two women, both white, filed lawsuit, alleging that the University had discriminated against them on the basis of their race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Gurumurthy Kalyanaram discusses the current state of this vital public policy question on consideration elements to admission to universities and colleges.\ There are many lawsuits based on Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision. The question in these retaliation lawsuits has always been what should be the nature of evidence necessary to show retaliation by the employer. In this essay, Gurumurthy Kalyanaram presents the decisions and results on this matter.
Title VII is a landmark piece of legislation that prohibits discrimination, including harassment, in employment based on race, sex, religion, color, and national origin by an employer. It also prohibits retaliation against an employee “because” the individual complained of, opposed, or participated in a proceeding about prohibited discrimination. There are many lawsuits arising out of disputes in interpretation of the collectively bargained agreements. Unions and employers work hard to craft CBAs, but lawsuits emerge even in cases of carefully designed CBAs. In this essay, Gurumurthy Kalyanaram reports on this important matter.
U.S. Supreme Court and Second Circuit have established precedents which mandate that (i) the provisions of a Collective Bargaining Agreement must be read as a whole in conjunction with other provisions; and (ii) the provisions of a Collective Bargaining Agreement must be interpreted in a manner that does not render any provision superfluous, meaningless, or of no effect. Dr Gurumurthy Kalyanaram was a tenured professor at The University of Texas at Dallas. He served at UT Dallas from 1988 to 2001. During his tenure at the University of Texas, he was Chairman of the Department of Marketing, Senior Director of the Master’s Programs, Founding Director of the Cohort MBA Program, Chair of the Master’s Program Committee, and Faculty Liaison for External Affairs.
Dr Gurumurthy Kalyanaram is a distinguished professor with a long record of academic achievements and honors. He received his B.E. degree in engineering in 1978 from the University of Madras, India, and his M.B.A. in 1983 from the University of Texas. He earned his Ph.D from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1989 in the field of Management Science, where he won the prestigious Harold Lobdell award. Dr Gurumurthy Kalyanaram was a Visiting Scholar at The Kennan Institute, The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., during 1990 to 1994. He was also a Fellow at the Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Pittsburgh, during 1995 to 1997. |